Credible threats in negotiations
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Credible threats in negotiations a game-theoretic approach by Harold Houba

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Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in Boston .
Written in English


  • Negotiation in business,
  • Threat (Psychology),
  • Game theory

Book details:

Edition Notes

Includes bibliographical references (p. 311-316) and index

Statementby Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt
SeriesTheory and decision library -- v. 32
ContributionsBolt, Wilko
LC ClassificationsHD58.6 .H68 2002
The Physical Object
Paginationxxi, 319 p. :
Number of Pages319
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17056789M
ISBN 101402071833
LC Control Number2002029687

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Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter , presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter , extends the analysis for negotiation situations where Cited by: Get this from a library! Credible threats in negotiations: a game-theoretic approach. [Harold Houba; Wilko Bolt] -- "Credible Threats in Negotiations is suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining. A non-credible threat is a term used in game theory and economics to describe a threat in a sequential game that a rational player would actually not carry out, because it would not be in his best interest to do so.. For a simple example, suppose person A walks up, carrying a bomb, to another person B. A tells B he will set off the bomb, killing them both, unless B gives him all his money. Get this from a library! Credible threats in negotiations: a game-theoretic approach. [Harold Houba; Wilko Bolt] -- The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a.

Credible Threat is the second book I've read by Ken Fite in the past 48 hours! And it is even better than the first, The Senator, which I thoroughly enjoyed, also. In Credible Threat, former Navy Seal and former guy in charge of his co-workers at the Department of Domestic Terrorism from which he's been terminated, Blake Jordan has been put /5(). Adapted from “Making Threats Credible,” by Deepak Malhotra (professor, Harvard Business School), first published in the Negotiation newsletter. While the stakes are usually lower, negotiation often resembles a game of Chicken. Both sides make threats in an effort to change their counterpart’s behavior or beliefs. You might threaten to take your business elsewhere unless the other. This story highlights the important role of threats in negotiations. Broadly speaking, a threat is a proposition that issues demands and warns of the costs of noncompliance. Even if neither party resorts to them, potential threats shadow most negotiations. A wise threat satisfies your own interests and targets the other side’s interests.   Right now Prime members can read the book for free. Go to the Prime Reading catalog and find my book “40 Paradoxes in Logic, Probability, and Game Theory” and select the option to borrow for free. Prime Reading. Be sure to read it soon! The promotion is valid for about 90 days, starting from March Here is a link to the book’s main page.

Credible Threat These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm : T. Furusawa. Before using threats in a negotiation, I suggest you consider the following precautions: First, threats have to credible. The other party must believe that the threat will be carried out. The other party must believe that the threat will be carried out. Start studying Chapter Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. Search. Browse. Negotiations begin when parties enter into an agreement. more credible threats can be made by the opponent than by the bargainer. I think this is less than optimal as well, because you lose any options that might have come out of negotiations with that person. Giving in to threats is very dangerous (you’ve validated to the other person that threats are a good way to get what they want from you, and .