Tiebout hypothesis and majority rule
Read Online
Share

Tiebout hypothesis and majority rule an empirical analysis by Dennis N. Epple

  • 292 Want to read
  • ·
  • 73 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

Subjects:

  • Majorities -- Econometric models.,
  • Expenditures, Public -- Political aspects -- Massachusetts -- Boston Metropolitan Area -- Econometric models.

Book details:

Edition Notes

StatementDennis Epple, Holger Sieg.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 6977, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 6977.
ContributionsSieg, Holger., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsHB1 .W654 no. 6977
The Physical Object
Pagination41 p. :
Number of Pages41
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL22399942M

Download Tiebout hypothesis and majority rule

PDF EPUB FB2 MOBI RTF

We are grateful to the National Science The paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and Tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions. The idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice.   The paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and Tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions. The idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential by: 7. BibTeX @MISC{Sieg99thetiebout, author = {Holger Sieg and Ariel Pakes and Ian Preston and Richard Romano and Stuart Rosenthal and Kerry Smith For Comments}, title = {The Tiebout Hypothesis and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis}, year = {}}. The paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and Tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions. The idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice.

The Tiebout Hypothesis and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis. By Thomas Romer, Holger Sieg, Ron Gallant, Tom Nechyba, We are grateful to the National Science The paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and Tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions. The idea behind the estimation procedure is to. The sorting of residential populations among metropolitan area communities and its impact on municipal service bundles is studied across metropolitan areas. There is strong empiricial support for the policy implications of Tiebout's model. The service bundles of metropolitan communities are . The Tiebout Hypothesis asserts that, in economic situations where it is optimal to have many jurisdictions offering competing packages of public goods, the movement of consumers to jurisdictions where their wants are best satisfied and competition between jurisdictions for residents will lead to near-optimal, “market-like” outcomes. in a Model of Residential and Political Choice In the present paper we revisit Tiebout’s hypothesis in a multi-community model of (majority rule) that determine political outcomes. Westhoff () constructs a model with a pure public good financed by.

Tiebout first proposed the model informally as a graduate student in a seminar with Richard Musgrave, who argued that the free rider problem necessarily required a political solution. Later, after obtaining his PhD, Tiebout fully described his hypothesis in a seminal article published in by the Journal of Political Economy. Tiebout (J Polit Econ –, ) argued that efficient local public good provision would emerge as households choose among communities offering different local public goods bundles. This article highlights research linking the Tiebout hypothesis to real-world local political jurisdictions, Author: Dennis Epple.   This has come to be known as the ‘Tiebout hypothesis’ and the related Tiebout community- choice mechanism has been dubbed ‘voting with your feet’. This article focuses on research linking the Tiebout hypothesis to local political jurisdictions. T. and Sieg, H. Interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule: an empirical. The Tiebout Hypothesis. The Tiebout Hypothesis. The political theory model by Charles Tiebout that, under ideal circumstances, people will reveal their preferences for municipal public goods by ‘voting with their feet’. (Tiebout, Charles () "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," The Journal of Political Economy.